Pay-to-Quit as a Means for Employee Selection
Other Title
離職金為員工選任之工具
Journal
當代會計
Journal Volume
26
Journal Issue
1
Start Page
31
End Page
76
ISSN
1609-3895
Date Issued
2025-05
Author(s)
劉乃熒
Abstract
This study uses data from a real estate company to investigate whether a pay-to-quit program can be a valid selection mechanism that encourages ill-fitting employees to voluntarily leave but retains better fitting employees. The empirical results indicate that probationary sales agents who stayed sold more and higher-valued houses than those who took the payment and left the company. To further explore whether the pay-to-quit program can improve the matching quality of hired probationary sales agents, we examine whether probationary sales agents who were selected through the traditional interview with a pay-to-quit program and stayed would show a higher level of matching quality in terms of duration and job performance than those who were only selected through the traditional interview. The results indicate that probationary sales agents who were selected through the traditional interview with a pay-to-quit program and stayed show a lower rate of departure and better job performance. The results provide evidence that a pay-to-quit program can serve as a useful selection mechanism.
Subjects
pay-to-quit program
employee selection
self-selection
matching quality
Type
journal article