強制性財務預測誤差與盈餘管理關係：20%門檻限制影響之研究
Other Title
Mandatory Management Forecast Errors as a Variable to Earnings Manipulation, with a 20% Hurdle Set by TAIEX Regulators
Journal
中國財務學刊
Journal Volume
7
Journal Issue
1
Start Page
59
End Page
96
ISSN
1022-2898
Date Issued
1999-04
Author(s)
Abstract
本研究探討國內企業是否改變帳面盈餘降低強制性財測誤差，檢視20%誤差限制盈餘管理影響。由於20%門檻為我國特有，本研究以全屬原創之主題與設計，探究企業因應管制規範之「對策」與可能扭曲。實証發現（1）全體強制性財測樣本（流動）裁決性應計盈餘顯著為正；進一步劃分樣本，財測高估與低估組（流動）裁決性應計盈餘都顯著為正；（2）操控前財測誤差高（低）估者會調高（降）（流動）裁決性應計盈餘；（3）操控前財測高（低）估者似藉票券損益調高（降）盈餘；觀諸操控後數據，不論帳面誤差高、低估者，在誤差趨近但未逾20%時，（流動）裁決性應計絕對顯著大於逾門檻者，也大於未超出但離門檻較遠公司。
This study explores whether firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange manipulate their mandatory management forecast errors (FE's) for fear of regulators' stop orders for the pending debt/equity offerings . We also examine the extent to which the 20% hurdle for FE's affects the significance of these FE's in explaining the magnitude of companies ' earnings management. Our empirical results support the notion of strategic manipulation. First, in our full, optimistic and pessimistic sample firms. companies' discretionary current accrual components (DCA's) in reported earnings are all significantly positive. Second, greater (less) DCA's appear to follow firms' optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts. Third, firms with negative (positive) pre-manipulation FE's appear to boost their security gains (losses). Consistently, DCA's for firms with percentage FE's immediately below 20% are significantly greater as opposed to those of the observations substantially beyond or below the hurdle.
Subjects
強制性財測
20%門檻
操控前財測誤差
（流動）裁決性應計盈餘
票券損益
mandatory management forecasts
20% hurdle rate
pre-manipulation forecast errors
discretionary current accruals
security gains and losses
Type
journal article