https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/22443
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | 國立臺灣大學哲學系 | zh |
dc.contributor | Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University | en |
dc.contributor.author | 黃懿梅 | - |
dc.contributor.author | Huang, Y.M. | en |
dc.creator | 黃懿梅 | - |
dc.creator | Huang, Y.M. | en |
dc.date | 1990-01 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-09-08T03:50:38Z | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-29T09:28:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-09-08T03:50:38Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-29T09:28:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1990-01 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/281964 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Any reductive analysis of the mental cannot captural the subjective character of experience. So the qualia is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of physical states. This paper includes three parts. 1. T. Nagel's what it is like argument' and F. Jackson's 'knowledge argument' argue that physicalism cannot give any explanation of the subjective qualities of our experiences and any physical informations cannot explain what red looks like. 2. An analysis and critique of the defenses of physicalism. 3. The argument against physicalism (identity theory) is an invalid argument. | en |
dc.language | zh-TW | - |
dc.relation | 國立臺灣大學哲學論評, 13, 161-184 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | 國立臺灣大學哲學論評 | - |
dc.title | 物理論與感值 | zh |
dc.title | Physicalism and Qualia | en |
dc.type | journal article | en |
dc.relation.pages | 161-184 | - |
dc.relation.journalissue | 13 | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.fulltext | no fulltext | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | - |
item.openairetype | journal article | - |
item.grantfulltext | none | - |
顯示於: | 哲學系 |
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